“Contrary to Law”: Determining the Scope of
Qualifying Predicate Offenses for 18 U.S.C.
§ 545
Arjun Prakash†
This Comment seeks to resolve an ongoing dispute among courts regarding the
correct interpretation of “contrary to law” in 18 U.S.C. § 545, a statute that criminalizes the unlawful importation of goods. In particular, courts disagree about
whether “contrary to law” includes administrative regulatory viol ations, which
would massively expand the applicability of § 545’s severe criminal penalties.
This Comment argues that analyzing previous versions of § 545 and applying
canons of statutory interpretation provide support for a narrow interpretation of the
statute. But these lines of analysis do not definitively establish that this interpretation is correct. As a result, this Comment considers the implications of the nondelegation doctrine, which provides a more conclusive resolution to the ongoing circuit
split. Specifically, because of the structure of § 545 and because the statute itself provides no authority for agencies to promulgate new regulations, allowing administrative violations to serve as predicate offenses for § 545 would potentially permit
agencies to independently use this statute to transform civil regulatory violations
into criminal offenses. Therefore, to avoid separation of powers concerns, only regulatory violations that are explicitly criminalized by other statutes should qualify as
predicate violations that can trigger § 545’s penalties.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2009 to 2015, Sterling Islands, a New Mexico–based
corporation, imported “Native American-style jewelry, arts, and
crafts” from the Philippines.1 These imported goods had removable stickers that indicated that they were made in the Philippines
but had no permanent country-of-origin markings.2 After importing these items, Sterling Islands sold them to various customers,
often under the pretense that the goods were authentic Native
American items.3 The company made millions of dollars in revenue from these sales before its owner and manager were apprehended by federal authorities.4
Sterling Islands’ actions were in clear violation of 19 C.F.R.
§ 134.43, a Department of Treasury regulation requiring Native
American–style jewelry to be “indelibly marked with the country
of origin.”5 But this regulation does not itself specify a punishment for violators.6 Given this lack of a built-in punishment, prosecutors used the regulatory violation as a predicate offense7 to
1

United States v. Sterling Islands, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1030 (D.N.M. 2019).
See id.
3
See id. at 1030–31.
4
See id. at 1030.
5
19 C.F.R. § 134.43(c)(2) (2021).
6
See 19 C.F.R. § 134.43 (2021).
7
In the § 545 context, a predicate offense is a violation of a different “law” that in
turn triggers the criminal penalties that are provided in § 545. For example, the violation
of an importation statute other than § 545 would be deemed “contrary to law” and could
2
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indict Sterling Islands and the affiliated individuals under a separate criminal statute,8 18 U.S.C. § 545. Section 545 states that
anyone who imports goods “contrary to law” is subject to a fine or
imprisonment of “not more than 20 years” or both.9 To determine
whether a § 545 violation had occurred, the District of New
Mexico had to answer two crucial questions: Is a violation of an
administrative regulation “contrary to law” under § 545, and, if
so, which regulatory violations qualify as “contrary to law”?10 Ultimately, the court held that all violations of “agencypromulgated regulations fall within” the scope of “contrary to
law,” so a § 545 violation had indeed occurred.11 But this outcome
was by no means guaranteed. Numerous courts have confronted
these same two questions and have arrived at several different
answers, creating an ongoing circuit split.
18 U.S.C. § 545 was first enacted as § 4 of the Tariff Act of
1866.12 Congress then reenacted this statutory provision twice
more in the Tariff Act of 192213 and the Tariff Act of 1930,14 leaving the language of the provision essentially untouched.15 Seventy-five years later, Congress reenacted the statute in its current form as 18 U.S.C. § 545 as part of the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.16 Section 545 has
two discrete provisions that apply the statute’s aforementioned
penalties—a fine, imprisonment of “not more than 20 years, or
both”—to slightly different conduct.17 The first provision applies
the statute’s penalties to
[w]hoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the
United States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces or attempts to smuggle or clandestinely introduce into the United
States any merchandise which should have been invoiced, or
makes out or passes, or attempts to pass, through the
therefore serve as a predicate offense for § 545. So the defendant could be charged with
violating both the underlying predicate statute and § 545.
8
See Sterling, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 1030.
9
18 U.S.C. § 545.
10 See Sterling, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 1042.
11 Id. at 1056.
12 See United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008).
13 Ch. 356, § 593(b), 42 Stat. 858.
14 Ch. 497, § 593(b), 46 Stat. 590.
15 See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 593(b), 42 Stat. 858, 982; Tariff Act of 1930,
ch. 497, § 593(b), 46 Stat. 590, 751.
16 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, § 310, 120 Stat. 192, 242.
17 18 U.S.C. § 545.
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customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other
document or paper.18
This provision has proven uncontroversial, with courts generally
recognizing that it specifically “criminalizes smuggling goods into
the United States,” a class of activities that is relatively welldefined.19
The meaning and boundaries of the second provision, however, are far less clear. The second provision applies § 545’s penalties to
[w]hoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into
the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the
transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law.20
The language in this provision has prompted several federal appellate courts to arrive at different interpretations of the range of
activities criminalized by § 545’s statutory text.
In particular, the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
diverged with respect to the meaning of “contrary to law” in this
statute. While these courts agree that violations of federal statutes are “contrary to law,” they disagree over whether and which
administrative regulatory violations can serve as predicate offenses, triggering the heavy criminal penalties in § 545. The
Fourth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,21 asserted that violations of all administrative regulations that have the “force and effect of law” qualify
as “contrary to law” under § 545.22 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
Fourth Circuit’s approach and interpreted the statute narrowly,
holding that regulatory violations can qualify as “contrary to law”
under § 545 only if a separate statute specifically provides criminal penalties for the violations.23 And rejecting both the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits’ approaches, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the rule of lenity—which counsels that courts should

18

18 U.S.C. § 545.
United States v. Heon Seok Lee, 937 F.3d 797, 812 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub
nom., Lee v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1125 (2020).
20 18 U.S.C. § 545 (emphasis added).
21 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
22 See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1994).
23 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186.
19
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interpret criminal statutes in a manner that favors defendants
when there is “grievous ambiguity”—should constrain the interpretation of § 545.24 Therefore, only regulations that are criminal
in nature based on their text or history can be “law” under the
importation statute.25
Although the subject of the circuit split may appear narrow,
it has substantial practical and theoretical implications.
Section 545 carries a statutory maximum sentence of twenty
years in prison.26 Therefore, depending on the scope of the statute’s applicability, a prosecutor could seek a lengthy prison sentence for a defendant who had committed only a regulatory offense, which, absent § 545, would result in no prison time. There
are thousands of regulations that deal with labelling, shipping,
tariff categories, and other minor details related to trade,27 so a
broader or narrower interpretation of § 545 would result in numerous regulations either gaining or losing the possibility of carrying severe criminal sanctions.
Although many § 545 convictions do not result in the full
twenty-year statutory maximum sentence, previous cases illustrate that the application of the statute still has important consequences for defendants. For example, the defendants in United
States v. Lawson28 were found guilty of violating § 545 because
they had unlawfully imported a rhesus macaque monkey.29 In the
absence of § 545, the defendants would have—at the most—faced
misdemeanor charges and monetary penalties for their actions.
But under § 545 they instead faced felony punishment and were
ultimately sentenced to two months in prison followed by a threeyear period of supervised release.30 The defendants argued that
they faced “unduly harsh punishment” and that the prosecutors
should have charged them under a statute that more specifically
dealt with their actions and imposed less serious criminal sanctions.31 The court rejected their arguments, noting that the government “may generally elect which statute it wishes to charge,”

24

See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1181–84 (11th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1182.
26 18 U.S.C. § 545.
27 See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 134.43(c) (2021) (specifying marking and labelling requirements for importing Native American–style jewelry).
28 618 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
29 See Lawson, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 1254–55.
30 See id. at 1262; Brief for Appellee at 5, United States v. Lawson, 377 F. App’x 712
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-30186).
31 Lawson, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
25
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even when “one statute imposes felony penalties and the other
merely imposes misdemeanor penalties.”32 The court further held
that this discretionary government decision was not subject to judicial review or to the rule of lenity.33 This case presents the archetypal application of § 545, in which prosecutors employ the
statute to elevate the punishments facing defendants who would
otherwise face relatively minor sanctions. It also shows how the
interpretation of § 545 can be the sole difference between a misdemeanor and a felony conviction. This difference has significant
practical consequences not only on defendants’ lives but also on
the government’s ability to respond to and potentially deter unlawful conduct.
But beyond this practical importance, courts’ interpretations
of “contrary to law” also implicate separation of powers concerns.
Specifically, if courts followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit and
interpreted § 545 broadly to allow most or all regulatory violations to serve as predicate offenses, executive agencies could
promulgate trade-related regulations under existing, delegated
statutory authority, creating new § 545 predicate offenses. This
could raise concerns about the executive branch overstepping its
bounds by creating and defining—rather than just enforcing—
criminal law. On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of § 545,
similar to the Ninth Circuit’s, that allows very few regulatory violations to serve as predicate offenses could pose the opposite
problem by limiting the executive branch’s ability to punish identified wrongdoings and perhaps undermining Congress’s deliberate decision to allow agencies to play an integral role in defining
§ 545 predicate offenses. These separation of powers concerns are
particularly relevant in the current moment because the Supreme
Court has expressed a desire to revisit and potentially reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, which prevents congressional delegations of legislative power to agencies.34
Given the important consequences of differing interpretations of “contrary to law” in § 545, this Comment seeks to resolve
the ongoing circuit split. Part I of this Comment provides a detailed legal background on the circuit split, discussing the

32 Id. at 1261–62 (quoting United States v. Edmonson, 792 F.2d 1492, 1497 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
33 Id. at 1262.
34 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting);
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., West Virginia v.
EPA, 142 S. Ct. 420 (2021).
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decisions that various circuits have reached on § 545’s scope and
the circuits’ underlying rationales. Part II then uses various lines
of analysis to begin to resolve the split by evaluating judicial interpretations of § 545’s predecessor statutes and considering the
meaning of “contrary to law” in active statutes other than § 545.
Though the analysis in Part II provides support for the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow interpretation of § 545, it fails to conclusively resolve the circuit split. Therefore, Part III takes a novel approach
to understanding § 545 by considering the interplay between the
scope of “contrary to law” and separation of powers concerns. This
analysis confirms the conclusions drawn in Part II and cements
the contention that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is correct. Allowing regulatory violations that are not specifically criminalized in
separate statutes to serve as § 545 predicate offenses would give
agencies the power to independently create and define crimes,
transferring legislative power to the executive branch. Therefore,
§ 545 should apply only to violations already criminalized by a
separate statute.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Numerous courts have, at least in passing, remarked on the
meaning of “contrary to law” in § 545. Only the Fourth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, however, have arrived at firm conclusions
on this issue. Part I.A will discuss the position that each of these
circuits has taken regarding § 545 and explore the subtle—yet
meaningful—differences among the courts’ positions. Then
Part I.B will present the positions of circuits that have commented on § 545’s scope but have not taken concrete stances on
the meaning of “contrary to law.” Although these other circuits,
namely the First, Second, and Seventh, have not articulated firm
conclusions, their commentary largely aligns with a broader understanding of § 545, similar to the Fourth Circuit’s position.
A. The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits Have All Arrived
at Different Understandings of “Contrary to Law” in § 545
Although the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all agree
that statutory violations are “contrary to law” under § 545, the
courts disagree regarding which regulatory violations are “contrary to law.” This Section will present each of these courts’ positions, starting with the Fourth Circuit’s position, put forth in
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1994,35 then moving on to the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 position,36 and
finally discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s position, articulated in
2013.37 Though the differences between the broadest of these interpretations (the Fourth Circuit’s)38 and the narrowest (the
Ninth Circuit’s)39 may seem small at first blush, the practical gap
between these positions is significant.
1. Under the Fourth Circuit’s approach, violations of
regulations with the “force and effect of law” are
predicate offenses.
The first federal appellate court in recent years to conclusively interpret “contrary to law” in the § 545 context was the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Mitchell.40 Richard Mitchell, an
employee of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, had brought animal hides and horns into the United States without following the
necessary steps to declare those imports.41 Mitchell’s acquaintance, Don Cox, had illegally hunted the animals from which the
hides and horns had been obtained and had enlisted Mitchell to
smuggle the goods from Pakistan into the United States.42 In total
Mitchell violated three different regulations: 19 C.F.R § 148.11,
which requires declaration of certain items to Customs officers;
50 C.F.R. § 14.61, which requires the completion of a particular
importation form; and 9 C.F.R. § 95.2, which requires that importers show the country of origin of hides and horns.43 These regulatory violations served as predicate offenses for his conviction
under § 545. Mitchell appealed his conviction, arguing that the
“‘contrary to law’ provision of § 545 embraces only conduct that
violates acts of Congress, not conduct that violates administrative
regulations.”44 He also argued in the alternative that “the ‘contrary to law’ provision of § 545 is ambiguous concerning whether
it includes violations of regulations and that the rule of lenity
therefore should apply.”45 The Fourth Circuit rejected both of
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 468–70 (4th Cir. 1994).
See United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008).
See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2013).
See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468–70.
See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1183–87.
39 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 467.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 468.
Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468.
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these arguments and affirmed his conviction.46 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court began by looking for the ordinary meaning
of “law.”47 The court noted that in the dictionary, “law” is “commonly defined to include administrative regulations.”48
Then, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision
in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. In Chrysler, the Court evaluated the
meaning of “law” in the phrase “authorized by law” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 and concluded that “properly promulgated, substantive
agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’” 49 The
Chrysler Court further concluded that this “traditional understanding” of the word “law” can be overridden only by a “clear
showing of contrary legislative intent” that Congress wanted the
word to take on a narrower meaning.50 The Court then clarified
that for a regulation to qualify as having the “force and effect of
law” it must satisfy three requirements. The regulation must
(1) be a substantive rule that was (2) “promulgated pursuant to a
congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority” and (3) “in conformity with congressional-imposed procedural requirements.”51
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chrysler, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the ordinary dictionary and
precedent-based meaning of “law” should control because the
court’s “review of the available legislative history of § 545 disclose[d] nothing to indicate that Congress clearly intended for the
‘contrary to law’ provision to be limited to statutory violations.”52
Finally, the court found further support from the Eighth Circuit,
which was the only prior court to consider “contrary to law” in this
context. Specifically, in Estes v. United States,53 the Eighth
Circuit concluded that for purposes of the Tariff Act of 1866, “contrary to law” included administrative regulatory violations.54

46

See id. at 469–70, 476.
See id. at 468. Evaluating the “ordinary meaning” of a statute—what its text
means to a lay observer—is a foundational tool of statutory interpretation. It is often the
first step that courts take in determining a statute’s meaning. See, e.g., Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“‘In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to
its language,’ giving the ‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’” (first quoting United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); and then quoting Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
48 Id. at 468 (citing Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)).
49 Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468 (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295–96).
50 Id. (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 295–96).
51 Id. at 470 (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301–02).
52 Id. at 469.
53 227 F. 818 (8th Cir. 1915).
54 See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 469 (citing Estes, 227 F. at 821–22).
47
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Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell held that § 545 unambiguously allows for violations of administrative regulations that have
the “force and effect of law” to qualify as predicate offenses.55 Furthermore, the rule of lenity was deemed inapplicable because the
statute was unambiguous.56
Turning to the facts of the case, the court then applied the
Supreme Court’s three-part test from Chrysler for determining
whether a regulation has the “force and effect of law” and concluded that all three of the regulations that Mitchell had violated
satisfied each prong of the Chrysler test and properly qualified as
“law” under § 545.57 Given that Mitchell’s regulatory violations
were therefore “contrary to law” under § 545, the court upheld his
conviction.58
2. The Ninth Circuit requires regulatory violations to be
specifically criminalized by statute.
More than a decade after Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit diverged
from the Fourth Circuit to put forth its own interpretation of “contrary to law” under § 545 in United States v. Alghazouli.59 In
Alghazouli, the defendants imported the chemical R-12 freon
from Mexico and sold it to automotive supply dealers for large
profits, thereby violating 40 C.F.R. § 82.4, an EPA regulation that
prohibits R-12 freon importation.60 The defendants were convicted
under § 545, with their 40 C.F.R. § 82.4 violation serving as the
predicate offense.61 As in Mitchell, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that their regulatory violation did not fall within
the meaning of “contrary to law” in § 545. However, in arriving at
its decision, the Ninth Circuit put forth a much narrower interpretation of “contrary to law” than the one asserted by the Fourth
Circuit.
The court began its analysis with the text of § 545, searching
for the ordinary meaning of “law.” Here the court’s analysis deviated from the Fourth Circuit’s: the Ninth Circuit noted that
although “law” has at times been defined broadly to include administrative regulations, other definitions of “law” define the

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See id. at 469–70.
See id. at 470.
See id. at 470–71.
See id.
517 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 1182–83.
See id. at 1183.
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word only as “a statute.”62 Thus, the term law did not “have a single clear meaning discernible from the text alone.”63 Having identified this textual ambiguity, the court then examined what “law”
meant in previous versions of § 545—namely, the 1866, 1922, and
1930 Tariff Acts. Because all of these statutory provisions have
essentially the same language, the court assumed that Congress
intended for “law” to retain the same meaning across the versions.64 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit cited two Supreme Court
opinions—United States v. Eaton65 and United States v.
Grimaud66—that came after the 1866 Tariff Act. The court asserted that both of these decisions “made clear . . . that a criminal
conviction for violating a regulation is permissible only if a statute explicitly provides that violation of that regulation is a
crime.”67
In Eaton the Supreme Court dealt with a conviction under
the Oleomargarine Act of 1886,68 a statute that regulated and
taxed the margarine industry.69 Most relevantly, part of this statute applied criminal penalties to any manufacturer or dealer of
oleomargarine who knowingly or willfully neglected or refused to
do “any of the things required by law” in running his business.70
The defendant was convicted under this Act for violating a minor
bookkeeping regulation.71 However, the separate statute that
promulgated the regulation “did not specify that” violations would
be criminal offenses.72 The Court reversed the conviction and
noted that “[i]t would be a very dangerous principle to hold that”
compliance with this bookkeeping regulation was “required by
law” under the Oleomargarine Act because there must be “sufficient statutory authority . . . for declaring any act or omission a
criminal offence.”73 This reasoning establishes that under the
Court’s understanding of the Constitution’s separation of powers,
a defendant could not be held criminally liable for violating an

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1183–84 (quoting Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. at 1184.
See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1184–86.
144 U.S. 677 (1892).
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1184.
Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209.
See Eaton, 144 U.S. at 678.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 678.
Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1185.
Id. (quoting Eaton, 144 U.S. at 688).
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administrative regulation unless Congress has explicitly criminalized the violation.
And in Grimaud the Court dealt with a conviction under the
Forest Reserve Act,74 which expressly stated that violations of
regulations promulgated under the Act “shall be punished as is
provided in” a separate statute.75 The defendant, who had violated
a regulation created under the Forest Reserve Act, argued that
Eaton should apply here and “that he could not be convicted of a
crime based on the violation of a regulation.”76 But the Court rejected this argument and noted that “the very thing which was
omitted” in the Oleomargarine Act “has been distinctly done” in
the Forest Reserve Act.77 Namely, unlike in Eaton, the relevant
statute in Grimaud specifically criminalized the regulatory violation in question, so criminal convictions for regulatory violations
were permissible and did not violate the separation of powers.78
Citing Eaton and Grimaud together, the Ninth Circuit in
Alghazouli asserted that the Supreme Court in the decades following the Tariff Act of 1866 allowed regulatory violations to be
charged as criminal offenses under the Act only if a specific statute had separately criminalized the violations.79
Building on this idea, the court also cited the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Estes. But the Ninth Circuit arrived at a different conclusion than the Fourth Circuit regarding the holding and importance of this case. The Ninth Circuit noted that Estes specifically mentioned and analyzed both Eaton and Grimaud. The
court then concluded that the Eighth Circuit had arrived at the
holding that the regulatory violations in Estes were “contrary to
law” under the 1866 Tariff Act only because the regulations the
defendant had violated were “fully authorized by law,” and those
violations were “made punishable by law.”80 Therefore, according
to the Ninth Circuit, Estes stands for the principle that a regulatory violation is “contrary to law” only if a statute specifically
criminalizes the violation. Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that because these three cases—Eaton, Grimaud, and Estes—
were decided before the reenactment of the 1866 Tariff Act,
Congress implicitly agreed with the interpretation of “contrary to
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Ch. 288, 33 Stat. 628 (1905).
Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1185 (citing Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 515).
Id.
Id. (citing Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 519).
See id.
See id. at 1184.
Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Estes, 227 F. at 821–22).
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law” in those cases by choosing not to change the language of the
Act when reenacting it.81
In addition to this argument about previous interpretations,
the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact that the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which reenacted82
§ 545, also added a new provision—§ 554—which, like § 545,
deals with smuggling.83 The court stated that § 554 and § 545 are
“closely related,” given that both were enacted through the same
Act, are codified in the same part of the U.S. Code, and deal with
similar subject matter.84 But whereas § 545 criminalizes importation done “contrary to law,” § 554 criminalizes exportation done
“contrary to any law or regulation.”85 According to the court, the
close connection and similar language between the statutes indicate that the word “law” has the same meaning in both statutes.86
Therefore, Congress’s deliberate choice to include “or regulation”
in § 554 means that “law” should not be understood to include all
regulations in § 545.87 After making this final supporting point,
the court held that only regulations for which there are statutes
that specifically criminalize violations can qualify as “law” under
§ 545.88 Applying this rule to the case at hand, the court noted
that a provision of the Clean Air Act89 specifically criminalizes violations of 40 C.F.R. § 82.4, the regulation that the Alghazouli
defendant had violated.90 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the defendants’ regulatory violations were in fact “contrary to
law” and that § 545 properly applied.
3. The Eleventh Circuit has taken a middle ground
approach based on the rule of lenity.
In United States v. Izurieta,91 the Eleventh Circuit rejected
both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of § 545 in
favor of a middle ground approach. The defendants had imported
81

See id.
Cf. id. (“Section 310 of the Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 545 by increasing the maximum sentence under § 545 from five to twenty years, but otherwise left § 545 unchanged.”).
83 See id. at 1187.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1186 n.3 (emphasis in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 554).
86 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
90 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187–88.
91 710 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2013).
82
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cheese, butter, and bread from Central America for distribution
and sale in the United States.92 In the course of their operations,
the defendants imported numerous shipments that were found to
be tainted with various contaminants, such as E. coli and salmonella, but failed to “redeliver, export, and destroy” the tainted
products, as required by FDA regulation 19 C.F.R. § 141.113.93
Although this regulatory violation would by itself only have given
“rise to a civil remedy of liquidated damages in the amount of
three times the value of the goods,” the violation was used as a
predicate offense to convict the defendants under § 545.94 Ultimately, the district court sentenced the defendants to a twentyseven-month term of incarceration, followed by a three-year term
of supervised release.95
On appeal, the defendants again argued that their regulatory
violation could not serve as a predicate offense for § 545, but this
time the court accepted their claim. The Eleventh Circuit began
its analysis of this question by first considering, and then rejecting, both the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Alghazouli and the
Fourth Circuit’s approach in Mitchell.96 First, the Eleventh
Circuit found the Ninth Circuit’s comparative analysis of § 545
and § 554 flawed and unpersuasive because § 554 was actually
“enacted decades after 18 U.S.C. § 545.”97 Then, although the
court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s general conclusion that
“law” is not limited to statutes and extends to some regulations,
it rejected the Fourth Circuit’s application of the three-prong
“force and effect of law” test.98 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to apply the Chrysler test because it would extend the
scope of the statute too far, allowing many, or perhaps even most,
regulations to qualify as “law” under § 545.99 The court also found
it troubling that the test was “derived from a non-criminal” administrative law context.100
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See id. at 1178.
Id. at 1178 & n.3.
Id. at 1179 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c)(3) (2012)).
Brief for Appellant at 13, Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (No. 11-13585-I).
See Izurieta, 710 F.3d. at 1180–82.
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Instead, the court concluded that the rule of lenity101 should
be applied to § 545 because “lenity remains an important concern
in criminal cases, especially where a regulation giving rise to
what would appear to be civil remedies is said to be converted into
a criminal law.”102 It arrived at this conclusion even though the
rule of lenity applies only when there is “grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty” in the statute.103 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the lack of express mention of regulatory violations in § 545 created ambiguity and that this ambiguity becomes grievous “where the text or history of the regulation creates a strong perception that a violation of the regulation
will give rise to civil remedies only.”104 Thus, the court held that
whenever a regulation has created a “strong perception” that it
gives rise only to civil remedies, § 545 cannot apply.105 Applying
this test to the facts of Izurieta, the court analyzed the text, history, and context of 19 C.F.R. § 141.113(c) and concluded that the
regulation “primarily acts to establish the general contractual
terms between Customs and the importer regarding temporary
release and storage of the imported goods, along with agreedupon liquidated damages for non-compliance.”106 Thus, the regulation was “civil only” and could not qualify as a “law” under
§ 545, and so the court vacated the defendants’ convictions.107
B. Other Circuits Have Not Taken Conclusive Positions on the
Meaning of “Contrary to Law” but Still Offer Useful
Commentary
Although the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are the
only federal appellate courts in recent years to have definitively
weighed in on the meaning of “contrary to law” in § 545, other
circuits have briefly addressed the issue without arriving at firm
positions. For example, in United States v. Place,108 the First
Circuit stated that some regulatory violations—including the violation in the case—qualify as predicate violations for § 545, but
101 See Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1182 (“When [statutory] ambiguity exists, ‘the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971))).
102 Id. at 1181–82.
103 Id. at 1182 (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 456 (1991)).
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1182–83.
107 Id. at 1184.
108 693 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2012).
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the court did not specify the precise subset of regulatory violations that qualify.109 In Place, the defendant, who traded sperm
whale teeth, had violated several regulations that were promulgated to enforce the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora110 (CITES) treaty.111
The defendant was convicted under the Lacey Act,112 which specifically criminalizes unlawful wildlife trade like the defendant’s
conduct, and under § 545, with the CITES regulatory violations
serving as the predicate offenses.113
The First Circuit began its “contrary to law” analysis by noting that it found “persuasive” the argument that “‘law’ is much
more commonly understood to include regulations.”114 It then rejected the argument that comparing § 545 to § 554 reveals that
“law” does not include regulations.115 Specifically, the court noted
that this comparison was flawed because § 554 “was enacted well
over a hundred years after the original version of” § 545.116 Moreover, the court stated that despite reenacting § 545 “multiple
times[,] Congress has never sought to exclude regulations despite
almost a century of circuit-court precedent holding that the word
‘law’ in the statute includes regulations.”117 And finally, the First
Circuit declined to apply the rule of lenity to § 545, noting a lack
of ambiguity as to whether “contrary to law” includes regulations.118 All of this indicates implicit support for an expansive approach, close to the Fourth Circuit’s in Mitchell. But again, despite these similarities, the First Circuit’s only explicit conclusion
was that § 545 covers some regulatory violations, including violations of the CITES regulations at play in Place. And given that
the CITES regulations are arguably also specifically criminalized
by the Lacey Act, they would qualify as “contrary to law” even
under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Alghazouli and the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Izurieta.
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See id. at 228–29.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Jul. 1, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
111 See Place, 693 F.3d at 222.
112 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378.
113 See Place, 693 F.3d at 222–23.
114 Id. at 228.
115 See id. at 229.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See Place, 693 F.3d at 229.
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The Second Circuit also touched upon the meaning of “contrary to law” in United States v. Koczuk.119 However, that court
presented significantly less analysis and fewer conclusions regarding § 545 than the First Circuit did in Place. The defendant
in Koczuk, who had imported Russian sturgeon roe without
proper permits, was convicted of violating § 545, with 50 C.F.R.
§ 23.12(a)(2)(i)—another CITES regulation—serving as the predicate offense.120 As in Place, the Lacey Act arguably criminalized
this CITES regulatory violation specifically, and the defendant
was convicted under the Lacey Act in addition to § 545.121 The
court found no issue with the conviction under § 545, citing the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mitchell in support of the proposition
that violators of CITES regulations can be prosecuted under
§ 545.122 By citing Mitchell, the Second Circuit also implicitly conveyed support for the Fourth Circuit’s approach to § 545. But because the regulatory violation here, which had been specifically
criminalized in another statute, would likely have been considered “contrary to law” under the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches as well, it remains unclear exactly where the Second
Circuit would fall in the ongoing circuit split.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit briefly discussed the meaning of
“contrary to law” in United States v. Heon Seok Lee.123 The defendant, Lee, operated a company that produced industrial fans in
South Korea.124 But in an effort to tap into the funds earmarked
by the U.S. government for American-made industrial supplies,
Lee falsely labelled his fans as made in the United States.125 This
false labelling violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a), which served as the
predicate offense for Lee’s conviction under § 545.126 The Seventh
Circuit noted that the second paragraph of § 545 “makes it a
crime to fraudulently or knowingly import merchandise in any
manner contrary to law.”127 It then affirmed Lee’s conviction because he had “circumvented” the country-of-origin labelling requirements in § 1304(a) “in a fraudulent fashion,” thereby
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252 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
See id. at 94.
121 See id.
122 Id. (citing Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 470–71).
123 937 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom., Lee v. United States, 140
S. Ct. 1125 (2020).
124 See id. at 802.
125 See id. at 802–03.
126 See id. at 812.
127 Id. at 813.
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importing merchandise in a manner that was “contrary to law.”128
However, because the predicate offense in Lee was statutory, the
Seventh Circuit’s decision to affirm Lee’s conviction under § 545
provides no clues regarding whether the court understood “contrary to law” to include regulatory violations.129
II. INTERPRETING § 545 USING PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF § 545 AND
COMPARATIVE STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Now that Part I has laid out the legal background of the circuit split, this Part begins to resolve the disagreement by revisiting some of the lines of analysis that courts have already used in
interpreting § 545. First, Part II.A looks at case law from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to determine how courts
interpreted “contrary to law” in the Tariff Act of 1866, the original
version of § 545. This examination reveals that courts generally
understood “contrary to law” to include only regulatory violations
that were specifically criminalized by a statute. Congress arguably knew about this judicial interpretation when it reenacted the
Tariff Act of 1866 in 1922 and again in 1930. And given that § 545
contains essentially the same language as the Tariff Acts of 1866,
1922, and 1930, Congress apparently did not feel the need to override this judicial interpretation. This suggests that courts should
continue to understand “contrary to law” as including only regulatory violations that are specifically criminalized by statutes,
aligning with the Ninth Circuit’s position in Alghazouli.
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Lee, 937 F.3d at 812–13.
It is worth noting that the court rejected Lee’s argument that “the words ‘imports
. . . merchandise contrary to law’ in § 545 mean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal
to import, not merely that the merchandise was imported in a condition noncompliant with
some federal law or regulation somewhere.” Id. at 812. Because the court rejected Lee’s
argument, one could claim that the court implicitly supported the interpretation that “contrary to law” means “noncomplian[ce] with some federal law or regulation somewhere.” Id.
Furthermore, “some federal law or regulation somewhere” could be understood broadly to
mean that all statutory and all regulatory violations qualify as predicate offenses under
§ 545. But this interpretation of Lee is a stretch. Given that the statement in question was
simply the court’s description of Lee’s argument on appeal, it is unlikely that the court
intended any part of this statement to be construed as its definitive position on the meaning of “contrary to law.” It seems far more likely that the court was merely attempting to
clarify Lee’s position. Moreover, given that the predicate offense for Lee’s § 545 conviction
was a statutory—not a regulatory—violation, the Seventh Circuit would have little reason
to discuss whether regulatory violations qualify as predicate offenses at all. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit, unlike the First and Second Circuits, did not provide any helpful clues
regarding the court’s leanings on whether and which regulatory violations are “contrary
to law.”
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Then, Part II.B looks at the way “contrary to law” has been
interpreted in the context of other statutes, namely 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595a(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1425, and 18 U.S.C. § 554. This analysis
suggests that courts have repeatedly interpreted “contrary to
law” quite narrowly, excluding most, if not all, regulatory violations. Under the “whole code rule,” courts should interpret terms
consistently across different statutes, so this analysis provides
further support for the Ninth Circuit’s position that “contrary to
law” should be understood narrowly in the § 545 context. Though
all of these lines of analysis support the Ninth’s Circuit interpretation, due to various limitations, they do not decisively resolve
the issue. But the analysis in Part III will address this lingering
uncertainty, conclusively resolving the circuit split.
A. Federal Courts’ Interpretations of “Contrary to Law” in the
Previous Versions of § 545 Align with the Ninth Circuit’s
Current Interpretation
Given that the language in § 545 is essentially the exact same
as in the statute’s preceding iterations, understanding how courts
interpreted “contrary to law” in these previous versions provides
a better sense of Congress’s intent in repeatedly reenacting the
language that now makes up § 545. In short, looking to previous
interpretations of “contrary to law” can shed light on the correct,
current scope of § 545. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits both engaged in this line of analysis when interpreting § 545 but arrived
at starkly different conclusions. The Fourth Circuit concluded in
Mitchell that courts had previously interpreted “contrary to law”
to include all regulatory violations that had the force and effect of
law, while the Ninth Circuit concluded in Alghazouli that courts
had interpreted “contrary to law” to encompass only regulatory
violations that were criminalized by accompanying statutes.
Given this divergence, independently examining courts’ previous
interpretations of “contrary to law” can help to resolve the § 545
circuit split. In particular, the three cases discussed in this Section—Estes v. United States, Goldman v. United States,130 and
Keck v. United States131—all of which deal with convictions under
the Tariff Act of 1866, help illuminate what Congress likely understood “contrary to law” to mean when it reenacted this language in the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930.
130
131

263 F. 340 (5th Cir. 1920).
172 U.S. 434 (1899).
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The courts in Mitchell and Alghazouli both cited the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Estes in support of their interpretations of
“contrary to law” but characterized it quite differently. An analysis of Estes demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit’s characterization was correct. In Estes the defendants assisted in importing
cattle from Mexico that were not properly declared to, or inspected by, Customs.132 These actions violated several regulations, and the defendants were convicted under the Tariff Act of
1866 for facilitating the importation of the cattle “contrary to
law.”133
In reviewing this conviction, the Eighth Circuit began by describing the Supreme Court’s holding in Eaton. The court explained that the Supreme Court had vacated Eaton’s conviction
based on the logic that if Congress had intended for violations of
Internal Revenue Service regulations to be criminally punished
under the Oleomargarine Act, “it would have said so.”134 The
Eighth Circuit then discussed the Court’s subsequent decision in
Grimaud.135 It explained that the Court had upheld Grimaud’s
conviction because, unlike in Eaton, the relevant statute in
Grimaud had specifically “provided that any violation of” rules
and regulations stemming from the statute “should be punished
as provided” in the statute.136 Applying the holdings from these
two Supreme Court decisions to the facts of Estes, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the regulations that the defendants had violated when importing cattle “were fully authorized by law, and
their violation [was] made punishable by law.”137 Therefore, “it
was proper” to bring charges under the Tariff Act’s “contrary to
law” provision.138
As previously discussed, the Fourth Circuit in Mitchell and
the Ninth Circuit in Alghazouli also both enlisted the Estes decision for support but characterized it quite differently. The Fourth
Circuit asserted that Estes held quite broadly that administrative
regulations fall within the purview of “law,”139 whereas the Ninth
Circuit stated that Estes built on the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Eaton and Grimaud and held that regulatory violations are
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

See Estes, 227 F. at 820–21.
See id. at 821–22.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Estes, 227 F. at 821.
Id. at 821–22.
See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 469.
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“contrary to law” only if they are specifically criminalized by a
statute.140 Reexamining this disputed decision, particularly its
treatment of Eaton and Grimaud, reveals that only the Ninth
Circuit accurately characterized the Estes holding. This reexamination also affirms the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that Estes aligns
with and supports the narrower interpretation of “contrary to
law” put forth in Alghazouli: regulatory violations are contrary to
law only when specifically criminalized by statute.
The Fifth Circuit in Goldman also interpreted “contrary to
law” in the context of the Tariff Act of 1866. This case dealt with
defendants who were convicted under the Tariff Act of 1866 because they had “knowingly received” a “coil of rope that had been”
unlawfully “landed . . . from a foreign port, without first having
obtained a permit from the collector of internal revenue.”141 These
actions also violated § 2872 of the Revised Statutes, and this violation served as the predicate offense for the Tariff Act conviction.142 The defendants argued that the Tariff Act was intended to
punish only individuals who sought to evade paying a duty on imported merchandise.143 But the court rejected this argument and
noted that the Act’s “contrary to law” language had a “wider
scope,” covering violations of “regulations relating to the introduction of merchandise into the country” and not just applying to
duty laws.144 However, when explaining the precise subset of regulations that the Tariff Act covered, the court then stated that
“contrary to law” meant the “violation of any regulation . . . established by law” (other than the Tariff Act itself) “and made punishable when disobeyed.”145 After making this statement, the court
cited the Eighth Circuit’s Estes decision for support.146 This all
suggests that the Fifth Circuit’s approach to “contrary to law” under the Tariff Act of 1866 mirrored the Eighth Circuit’s approach,
limiting the regulatory violations that could qualify as predicate
offenses for the Tariff Act to those that were expressly criminalized by another statute. Once again, this tracks the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning and conclusions in Alghazouli.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Keck aligns with the
conclusions in Goldman, Estes, and, by extension, the Ninth
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1185–86.
Goldman, 263 F. at 341.
See id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
Id.
See Goldman, 263 F. at 343 (citing Estes, 227 F. 818).
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Circuit’s approach in Alghazouli. The defendant in Keck was
charged with violating the Tariff Act of 1866 because he had allegedly imported diamonds into Philadelphia unlawfully.147
Although this case primarily dealt with the characteristics of a
legally permissible indictment, the Keck Court briefly remarked
on the meaning of “contrary to law” in the Tariff Act. The Court
stated that the “words, ‘contrary to law,’ contained in the statute,
clearly relate to legal provisions not found in [the Tariff Act] itself.”148 But more specifically, the Court stated that “importing
merchandise is not per se contrary to law, and could only become
so when done in violation of specific statutory requirements.”149
Although the Court did not conclusively define the correct scope
of the “contrary to law” provision, its statement that violations of
“specific statutory requirements” are what qualify as “contrary to
law” suggests that the Court understood the Tariff Act narrowly,
perhaps exclusively encompassing statutory violations.
Taken together, Estes, Goldman, and Keck suggest that
courts understood the proper scope of the Tariff Act of 1866 to be
quite narrow, including, at most, only regulatory violations that
were made criminally punishable by separate statutes. As the
Ninth Circuit reasoned in Alghazouli, this judicial understanding
of the Act provided the background against which Congress reenacted the Tariff Act of 1866 in 1922 and again in 1930, preserving
the language of the original Act in the subsequent reenactments.
Notably, Congress saw no need to add clarifying language to the
statutory provision in either of these reenactments. Thus, assuming that Congress had awareness of this judicial interpretation of
“contrary to law,” it implicitly ratified this understanding of the
statute. This assumption of congressional intent in turn sheds
light on the proper understanding of § 545 because Congress
again preserved the relevant statutory language from the previous Tariff Acts when enacting § 545. This line of analysis supports
the conclusion that modern courts should understand “contrary
to law” in § 545 in the same way that the courts in Estes,
Goldman, and Keck did over a century ago—an understanding
that neatly aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s approach in
Alghazouli.

147
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See Keck, 172 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Applying the Whole Code Rule Provides Further Support for
the Ninth Circuit’s Understanding of § 545
Textual analysis of § 545 provides further clarity to the statute’s meaning. As previously discussed, Mitchell and Alghazouli
put forth different dictionary definitions for the word “law.” The
Fourth Circuit in Mitchell noted that “law” is “commonly defined
to include administrative regulations,”150 while the Ninth Circuit
stated in Alghazouli that “law” can be defined as including only
statutes.151 This divergence makes it clear that “law” does not
have one undisputed dictionary definition, so other methods of
textual analysis are needed to discern the meaning of “contrary
to law” in § 545. Specifically, it is illuminating to examine how
the phrase “contrary to law” has been interpreted in statutes
other than § 545 and to apply the whole code rule.
The whole code rule is a canon of statutory interpretation
that encourages courts to construe ambiguous statutory terms “to
contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and
comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.”152 Employing this canon often entails determining the
meaning of the ambiguous term across various statutory contexts
and then applying that meaning to the case at hand. The Supreme
Court has used this methodology in numerous cases to determine
the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.153 The underlying reasoning for the whole code rule is twofold. First, the rule arguably
tracks congressional intent because “Congress has a consistent
way of expressing certain policy choices, such that differences in
the wording of two similar statutes reflect differences in congressional intent.”154 Additionally, the whole code rule reflects a
judge’s obligation to “make sense of the law as a whole,” making
the entire legal landscape a coherent whole by providing consistency in the meaning of words across statutes.155
An analysis of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) is a good starting point
for application of the whole code rule because that statute also
contains the phrase “contrary to law.” The statute, which, like
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Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 468.
See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1183–84.
152 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991).
153 See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 389 (2009); Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76,
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§ 545, deals with unlawful importation, states that “[m]erchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the
United States contrary to law” can be seized, forfeited, or detained
if certain other conditions are met.156 In United States v. Davis157
the Second Circuit interpreted “contrary to law” in the context of
§ 1595a(c). In Davis the government had initiated a civil forfeiture claim under § 1595a(c) against the defendant to recover an
allegedly stolen work of art.158 The government argued that the
art had been imported to the United States contrary to law.159
Specifically, the art had previously been stolen from a museum in
France, violating a different statute, the National Stolen Property
Act160 (NSPA), which served as the predicate offense for
§ 1595a(c).161 In response, the defendant argued that “‘contrary to
law’ refers only to violations of the customs laws, not to violations
of the NSPA.”162 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and
put forth a broader interpretation of “contrary to law” than the
defendant desired.163 The court pointed out that § 1595a(c) references other federal statutes, such as those dealing with copyright
and trademark.164 It then went on to state that the fact that
§ 1595a
incorporates by reference federal laws that do not directly
pertain to customs enforcement counsels against a reading of
“contrary to law” that might preclude its application to those
very statutes. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that
the phrase “contrary to law” in Section 1595a(c) means exactly what it says: the government may seize and forfeit merchandise that is introduced into the United States illegally,
unlawfully, or in a manner conflicting with established law,
regardless of whether the law violated relates to customs
enforcement.165
A careful look at the court’s language in this portion of Davis
reveals that the Second Circuit used the words “law” and
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“statutes” interchangeably, first referring to copyright and trademark statutes as “law” and then stating in the next sentence that
“contrary to law” means “conflicting with established law, regardless of whether the law violated relates to customs enforcement.”166 It is, of course, possible that this interchangeable usage
was merely coincidental or had no deeper significance. But it is
also possible that the interchangeable usage suggests that in rejecting the defendant’s suggestion that “contrary to law” is limited
to violations of importation statutes, the court intended to extend
the scope of “contrary to law” to include only other statutory, not
regulatory, violations. Assuming consistency across statutes, this
possibility counsels in favor of a narrow interpretation of “contrary to law” in § 545.
A second statute that features “contrary to law” is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1425, which deals with the unlawful procurement of citizenship
or naturalization.167 This statute applies significant criminal penalties to “[w]hoever knowingly procures or attempts to procure,
contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary
or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship.”168 Exploring
the meaning of “contrary to law” in this different statutory context, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Puerta169 appears to
have arrived at a far narrower interpretation of the phrase than
either its § 545 interpretation in Alghazouli or the Second
Circuit’s § 1595a(c) interpretation in Davis.170 In Puerta, the defendant Antonio Puerta was convicted of violating § 1425 by making false statements during his naturalization application process.171 In explaining the details of the conviction, the court noted
that § 1425(a) “does not define the phrase ‘contrary to law,’” and
then explained that “[p]resumably the ‘law’ referred to is the law
governing naturalization, 8 U.S.C., ch. 12, subchapter III.”172
Thus, the court seemingly limited “contrary law” to violations of
only a small subset of federal statutes, excluding both regulatory
violations and statutory violations unrelated to naturalization.
This case and the Second Circuit’s decision in Davis suggest
that courts, when interpreting “contrary to law” in statutory contexts other than § 545, have understood the phrase narrowly,
166
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excluding most, if not all, regulatory violations. Assuming there
either is or should be consistency in the meaning of a particular
phrase across different statutes, Davis and Puerta both indicate
that courts should also narrowly construe “contrary to law” in
§ 545. This lends additional support for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 545 and further discredits the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits’ approaches because their interpretations would give
“contrary to law” a dramatically broader meaning in § 545 than
in other statutory contexts.
Finally, as alluded to in Part I.A.2, the Ninth Circuit in
Alghazouli employed a version of the whole code rule when it compared § 545 to 18 U.S.C. § 554, both of which are provisions in the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.173
The court noted that the two provisions use almost identical language, aside from one meaningful variation: § 545 uses the
phrase “contrary to law,” while § 554 uses the phrase “contrary to
any law or regulation.”174 The court reasoned that the addition of
“or regulation” in § 554 must mean that “contrary to law,” does
not by itself include regulatory violations.175 The court then concluded that because § 545 and § 554 are both part of the same act
and use almost identical language, “contrary to law” should have
a consistent meaning across both provisions.176 Thus, few, if any,
regulatory violations should qualify as predicate offenses
under § 545.177
Both the First and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly rejected
this comparative analysis argument because § 545 was not enacted at the same time as § 554.178 Specifically, the courts noted
that although both § 545 and § 554 were within the PATRIOT
Reauthorization Act, this Act merely reauthorized § 545, whereas
§ 554 was an entirely new provision.179 Because § 545’s “contrary

173 See Alghazouli, 517 F.3d at 1187. Given that § 545 and § 554 are both part of the
PATRIOT Act, applying a presumption of consistency in meaning across the two provisions
could be more precisely labelled as an application of the whole act rule rather than of the
whole code rule. But given that, as I argue below, § 545 was enacted in its initial form
before § 554, the provisions can be understood as originating from two different statutes,
so the whole code rule is what counsels in favor of interpreting “contrary to law” consistently. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I continue to use the term “whole code rule” in
this Section.
174 Id. at 1186 n.3, 1187 (emphasis in original).
175 See id. at 1187.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 1187.
178 See Place, 693 F.3d at 228–29; Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181.
179 See Place, 693 F.3d at 229; Izurieta, 710 F.3d at 1181.
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to law” language has been present since the Tariff Act of 1866,
those courts concluded that using § 554 to shed light on the meaning of this phrase in § 545 is flawed.180
Though many years passed between the original enactment
of the language in § 545 and the later enactment of § 554, comparative analysis between the two statutes is still illuminating.
The whole code rule suggests that courts should understand “contrary to law” consistently across statutory provisions, even if
those provisions were enacted at different times. Also, the argument for consistent meaning is particularly strong here.
Sections 545 and 554 use almost identical language and deal with
the exact same subject matter (restrictions on trade). And even
though § 545 was not first enacted in the PATRIOT
Reauthorization Act, it was expressly reauthorized in this Act
alongside the enactment of § 554. All of this suggests that
Congress was, at the very least, aware of § 545’s language when
devising § 554 and perhaps even took the language for § 554 directly from § 545. Thus, Congress’s choice to add “or regulation”
to § 554 implies that it did not understand “contrary to law” to
encompass all, or even most, regulatory violations—otherwise,
the subsequent addition of “or regulation” in § 554 would have
been entirely superfluous. Alternatively, if Congress already understood “contrary to law” to include regulatory violations but just
added “or regulation” to create extra clarity in § 554, then it arguably would have made the same clarifying addition to § 545
when reauthorizing the provision. The conclusions that emerge
from comparing § 545 and § 554 align with the conclusions from
analyzing § 1595a(c) and § 1425, providing additional evidence
that “contrary to law” retains a consistently narrow meaning, no
matter the statutory context.
Looking at how previous courts interpreted the Tariff Act of
1866 and how “contrary to law” has been understood in other statutory contexts hints at the correct interpretation of § 545. But unfortunately, these suggestions are not enough to confidently conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “contrary to law”
in Alghazouli is correct. Each of the lines of analysis pursued in
Part II has its limitations. Decisions like Keck, Goldman, and
Estes are helpful in understanding how courts had interpreted a
previous version of § 545. But these cases are over a century old,
and their applicability to understanding § 545 rests on the
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assumption that Congress was aware of the common judicial interpretation of “contrary to law” and intended to retain that interpretation through its successive reenactments of the Tariff Act
of 1866. Additionally, while more recent cases like Davis and
Puerta offer subtle indications of whether “contrary to law” includes regulatory violations in other statutory contexts, these
cases ultimately do not address this question in plain, direct, and
indisputable language. And it is possible that applying the whole
code rule fundamentally misinterprets congressional intent for
§ 545 and that “contrary to law” should actually take on different
meanings in different statutory contexts.181 Thus, while Part II
tilts the scales in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s approach to § 545, it
falls short of conclusively proving the position.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
In light of the shortcomings of the analyses in Part II, Part III
takes a different and novel approach to resolve the § 545 circuit
split: using binding Supreme Court separation of powers case law
and doctrine to definitively prove that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “contrary to law” in § 545 was correct. Part III.A begins by providing a brief background on scholarship and Supreme
Court case law regarding the separation of powers and, more specifically, the constitutionality of “administrative crimes.”
Part III.B then applies these Supreme Court decisions and the
overarching principles governing administrative crimes to the
§ 545 context to determine which interpretations of “contrary to
law” are constitutionally permissible. Because § 545 does not itself authorize agencies to promulgate regulations, this statute
poses more serious separation of powers concerns than the typical
administrative crimes that the Court has deemed unproblematic.
Ultimately, due to these unique concerns, this Part concludes that
only the Ninth Circuit’s approach—which requires regulatory violations to be specifically criminalized by a statute to be § 545
predicate offenses—is consistent with the Supreme Court’s current approach to the separation of powers. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Court seems likely to resurrect and
strengthen the nondelegation doctrine in the near future, which
would force Congress to delegate power to agencies with more precision and tighter constraints.
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A. Background on the Separation of Powers and
Administrative Crimes
Under the nondelegation doctrine, the legislature is prohibited from delegating its legislative powers to the executive branch
or any other entity because the Constitution fully vests all legislative power in Congress.182 Though the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged and reaffirmed the importance of the nondelegation doctrine, the Court virtually never finds that statutes
violate the doctrine.183 In fact, the first and last times the Court
invalidated a statute on nondelegation grounds were in 1935,
leading some to say that the nondelegation doctrine only had “one
good year.”184 Although courts have had little appetite to reverse
legislative actions under the nondelegation doctrine over the past
century, scholars have remained interested in the doctrine.185 And
one area in which some scholars have argued that nondelegation
concerns are particularly acute is the realm of “administrative
crimes.”186
An “administrative crime” exists when a “legislature creates
an offense in which an element incorporates by reference a body
of rules or regulations promulgated by an administrative
agency.”187 At the federal level this typically occurs when
Congress enacts a statute that gives a broad grant of authority to
an agency to promulgate regulations that deal with a specified
problem, and the statute provides that anyone who violates the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute faces a specific
criminal penalty.188 For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)
is empowered to create record retention rules relating to corporate audits, and the statute giving the agency this power
states that “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully violates . . .
any rule or regulation promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under [this grant of authority], shall

182 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
183 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
184 Id.
185 See, e.g., id.
186 See generally, e.g., Brenner M. Fissell, When Agencies Make Criminal Law, 10 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 855 (2020).
187 Id. at 860.
188 See id. at 860–61.
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be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.” 189
In instances like this, Congress supplies the general framework,
and the agencies define and detail the contours of the crimes.
1. Scholarship on the nondelegation concerns posed by
administrative crimes.
Some scholars have criticized this process of delegation, arguing that it “is for the legislative branch . . . to determine . . . the
kind of conduct which shall constitute a crime”190 and that strict
separation of powers is particularly important in the criminal law
context. For example, Professor Rachel Barkow argued in her article Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law that “as a matter of traditional constitutional interpretation, a strict separation
of powers in criminal law matters has a stronger textual and historical pedigree than in other contexts.”191 Specifically, she noted
that “[u]nder the scheme established by the Constitution . . .
Congress must criminalize the conduct, the executive must decide
to prosecute, and the judiciary (judges and juries) must agree to
convict. This scheme provides ample evidence that the potential
growth and abuse of federal criminal power was anticipated by
the Framers.”192 And aside from these textual considerations,
Professor Barkow also pointed out that there are functional reasons for a strict separation of powers when dealing with the criminal law. Namely, she reasoned that criminal law is the realm in
which “the state assumes the power to remove liberty and even
life.”193 Also, “[c]riminal defendants . . . [do not] have much sway
in the political process . . . [a]nd individuals already convicted of
a crime are perhaps the weakest of all groups in the political
arena,” which means that these groups lack the ability to meaningfully lobby and influence the administrative state.194 Similarly,
Professor Brenner Fissell has argued that it is important for democratic accountability for the legislature to be solely responsible
for defining what conduct triggers criminal sanctions because
189

Id. at 860 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b)).
See id. at 856 (quoting CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 10 (15th
ed. 2019)).
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such sanctions have the “especially harsh effect of liberty deprivation.”195
Additionally, in Nondelegation and Criminal Law, Professors
Andrew Hessick and Carissa Byrne Hessick supplied several
other reasons for why the “delegation of criminal rulemaking
power is more problematic than noncriminal delegations.”196 Specifically, they noted that agency delegations “concentrate power
in a single branch of government.”197 And this concentration poses
a severe threat to individual liberty because “when the same institution both writes and enforces the law, it is much easier for
the government to punish individuals.”198 By eliminating the need
for alignment between Congress and the executive branch, which
often have diverging priorities, delegations remove a structural
barrier to punishment and liberty deprivation.199 Additionally,
these scholars echoed Professor Fissell’s concern that agency delegations “undermine government accountability to the public” because agencies are relatively insulated from the pressures of popular sentiment.200 And they noted that this issue is particularly
troubling in the criminal law context because “criminal laws pose
a significant opportunity for government abuse” by providing the
state with a “powerful tool to codify prejudices or impose unwarranted burdens on certain segments of the public.”201 Finally, the
scholars contended that delegation results in “less notice to the
public of their legal obligations” because the lack of bicameralism
and presentment requirements allows agencies to rapidly change
the criminal law.202 These scholars’ arguments imply that courts
should be more willing to strike down statutes that delegate expansive power to agencies to create and define crimes or at least
that courts should construe statutory delegations to agencies
more narrowly in the realm of criminal law.
On the other hand, some scholars strongly favor congressional delegation to agencies to devise administrative crimes. For
example, Professor Dan Kahan discussed a number of what he
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perceived to be the merits of administrative crimes.203 Specifically, he noted that it is virtually impossible for Congress to define the entire criminal code on its own because of political constraints, resource and capacity limitations, and Congress’s
inability to update the code with regularity.204 More pointedly,
Professor Kahan stated that congressional gridlock would leave
important criminal law stuck in political machinery, reducing the
output of criminal legislation, which would create problematic
loopholes and gaps in the law.205 Given the inevitability of congressional delegation in this realm, Professor Kahan asserted
that the choice is between delegation to either executive branch
agencies or to the judiciary, which would then need to promulgate
criminal law through the federal common law.206 In light of this
choice, delegation to agencies to define crimes is preferable because the executive branch “has more experience with criminal
law enforcement,” remains more consistent in its rulemaking, and
remains “accountable to the people” through political checks.207
More broadly, scholars who support congressional delegation
to agencies commonly argue that delegation is wise because agencies have more subject matter expertise than Congress.208 This argument notes that because career civil servants in agencies deal
with a specific content area every single day, whereas members
of Congress and their staffs are generalists that deal with a wide
variety of issues, agencies are better suited to solving complicated
social problems.209 Aligning with Professor Kahan’s reasoning, another common argument for agency delegation is that delegation
promotes flexibility and efficiency in policymaking. Agencies,
which are far less encumbered by the need for consensus building
and less divided in their attention to the problem at hand, are
arguably more capable of quickly reacting to changing social circumstances and can better adjust and tailor rules and regulations
to reflect these changes.210 And given the sheer size of agencies
203 See Fissell, supra note 186, at 876–78 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470–88 (1996)).
204 See Kahan, supra note 203, at 473–85.
205 See id. at 474–75.
206 See id. at 471–79.
207 Id. at 470–71.
208 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 196, at 322 (citing Wendy E. Wagner, A Place
for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2019, 2024 (2015)).
209 See id.
210 See Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Reintroducing Compromise to the Nondelegation Doctrine,
90 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1074–75 (2002).
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relative to Congress and the enormous number of issues that
Congress has on its plate, some argue that delegation is the only
way that the federal government can make the thousands of policy decisions that are needed to keep the nation running.211 These
scholars insist that administrative crimes—and agency delegation in general—are not only necessary and permissible but also
desirable for effective governance. This suggests that courts
should continue to refrain from invalidating statutes on nondelegation grounds, even in the realm of criminal law.
2. Supreme Court case law on the constitutionality of
administrative crimes.
But setting aside academic debates, the practical reality is
that delegation to agencies is an extremely common method by
which federal criminal laws are put forth. And although it is “difficult to assess how numerous these administrative crimes are,”
some scholars have estimated that there are roughly three hundred thousand such crimes currently on the books.212 Moreover,
administrative crimes have been consistently sanctioned by the
Supreme Court. Grimaud was perhaps the first instance of the
Court deciding that administrative crimes are permissible. As
previously mentioned, the defendant in Grimaud was convicted
for violating a regulation that the Secretary of Agriculture had
promulgated under regulatory authority that Congress had delegated in the Forest Reserve Act.213 The Act also made violating
the Secretary’s regulations criminally punishable.214 The Court
concluded that this type of congressional delegation to agencies
was entirely permissible because “it was impracticable for
Congress to provide general regulations” that account for and consider the various minor details of what conduct harms forests.215
Thus, “in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to” create rules
that account for these minor details, “Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power,” thereby avoiding constitutional concerns.216 The Court also stated that from “the beginning of the

211 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987).
212 Fissell, supra note 186, at 862.
213 See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 507–09.
214 See id.
215 Id. at 516.
216 Id.
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government” it has been acceptable for Congress to give agencies
or executive officers the “‘power to fill up the details’ [of statutes]
by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the
violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment
fixed by Congress.”217 So the Court in Grimaud clearly found no
fault with the types of agency rules that nowadays would be considered administrative crimes.
The holding in Grimaud has remained relatively undisturbed
over the past century, with the Court continually reaffirming the
validity of administrative crimes. For example, in Loving v.
United States,218 the defendant, an Army private, was found guilty
of murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.219 While
sentencing the defendant, the court-martial considered aggravating factors that had been promulgated by the President pursuant
to congressional delegation of authority and applied three such
factors to the defendant’s conduct.220 The Supreme Court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the President’s promulgation of
these factors violated the Constitution, holding that that there “is
no absolute rule [ ] against Congress’ delegation of authority to
define criminal punishments.”221 The Court then specified that it
had “upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal,
so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal
offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations ‘confin[e]
themselves within the field covered by the statute.’” 222 In this
way, while the Court reaffirmed its position that agencies are
generally allowed to define what constitutes criminal conduct, it
also provided specific guidelines that Congress and agencies must
follow to ensure that an administrative crime is promulgated
constitutionally.
Despite the Supreme Court’s consistency in dealing with the
separation of powers, the Court has also indicated that it is preparing to revive and invigorate the nondelegation doctrine in the
near future, which could have significant impacts on how administrative crimes are treated going forward. In Gundy v. United
States223 the Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to the Sex
217
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219
220
221
222
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Offender Registration and Notification Act224 (SORNA), holding
that the Act—which allowed the Attorney General to promulgate
certain regulations for the initial registration of sex offenders—
did not provide the Attorney General with an unconstitutional
grant of legislative power.225 In particular, the Court arguably employed a saving construction in Gundy—interpreting SORNA in
a way that narrowed the statute’s grant of power to the Attorney
General—to avoid striking the statute down on nondelegation
grounds.226 This approach and outcome were in line with the
Court’s longstanding lenient approach to the nondelegation
doctrine.
However, the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Neil
Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Clarence Thomas, indicated that the Court will likely revisit and
significantly strengthen the nondelegation doctrine soon.227 The
dissent offered “a full-throated defense of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine”228 and proposed a test, consisting of three
guiding principles, for determining when the doctrine should be
used to invalidate a statute.229 First, the dissent noted that “as
long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill up the details.’” 230 Second, “once Congress prescribes the rule governing
private conduct,”231 it can authorize “the executive branch to find
the existence of certain facts before”232 that rule is applied. And
finally, the dissent’s test would allow Congress to authorize another branch to exercise power that is not legislative but rather
relates only to the way that branch exercises its own power.233
This would allow, for example, the executive branch to create internal, procedural rules that do not have substantive impacts on
private parties.234

224 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 34
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Even though only three Justices signed onto this dissenting
opinion, at least five sitting Justices have indicated a willingness
to take a similar position in a future nondelegation case. Justice
Samuel Alito stated in his concurring opinion in Gundy that if a
majority of the Court “were willing to reconsider the approach”
that the Court has taken regarding the nondelegation doctrine,
he “would support that effort.”235 And Justice Brett Kavanaugh,
who did not participate in Gundy, has suggested in his previous
D.C. Circuit opinions that he would also be willing to reconsider
and strengthen the nondelegation doctrine.236 Thus, it appears
that the question is not whether the nondelegation doctrine will
be reinvigorated but when the right case will arise for a majority
of the Court to effectuate this reinvigoration.
If the nondelegation doctrine were to take the form seen in
the Gundy dissent, Congress would be significantly limited in its
ability to delegate to agencies, and administrative crimes would
become far more suspect. The first principle in the Gundy dissent’s test goes further than the requirements found in cases like
Loving because it requires Congress to make all of the “policy decisions” by explicitly declaring which conduct constitutes a crime
and defining the contours and punishment for that crime. In the
administrative-crime context, this would presumably mean that
agencies could be tasked only with ironing out minor administrative details, such as how to conduct enforcement or what circumstance-specific conditions might merit consideration when determining whether an individual has committed the crime that
Congress defined. Therefore, under the likely future form of the
nondelegation doctrine, Congress would have to create criminal
laws with more specificity, and agencies would have less power
and autonomy in promulgating criminal law than under the
Court’s current approach.
B. Applying Separation of Powers Case Law and Doctrine to
§ 545 Reveals that the Ninth Circuit’s Approach Is Correct
Cases like Grimaud and Loving illustrate that administrative crimes generally do not raise serious constitutional concerns.
However, § 545 differs from the statutes that were at play in those
cases and others that commonly authorize agencies to create administrative crimes. Specifically, unlike the statutes that
235
236
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authorize the creation of a traditional or typical administrative
crime, § 545 does not itself grant any authority to agencies to
promulgate regulations. For instance, in the aforementioned SEC
record-retention regulation example, Congress had passed a statute that authorized the SEC to promulgate regulations, carrying
the force of criminal punishment, in accordance with the guiding
principle and core policy choices that Congress laid out in the statute. In contrast, § 545 does not authorize any agency to promulgate regulations of any sort; rather the statute merely provides
for a criminal punishment for anyone who engages in importation
activities “contrary to law.” Thus, if “contrary to law” were understood to include regulatory violations, then a regulatory violation
could be criminalized by § 545 without § 545 itself authorizing the
creation of that regulation, unlike with the SEC authorization
statute or the statute in Grimaud. This statutory structure poses
significantly different nondelegation doctrine concerns than the
standard administrative crimes that the Court has deemed permissible through the years.
In Grimaud, the Court allowed congressional delegation in
large part because it had long been permissible for Congress to
give executive officers or agencies the “‘power to fill up the details’
[of statutes] by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress.”237 The fundamental logic underlying this statement appears to be that if an agency is filling in only
the details of a statute, then Congress has already decided what
general types of conduct should be criminalized. Indeed, the statute at issue in Grimaud gave the Secretary of Agriculture the
power to “make provisions for the protection against destruction
by fire and depredations upon the public forests and forest reservations” and to “make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure the objects of such reservations; namely, to regulate their
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.”238 This provided constraining guidelines for the executive officer to follow in creating rules, and it applied the statute’s
criminal penalties only to violations of this constrained and discrete set of rules.
When applied to § 545, the Grimaud logic crumbles if “contrary to law” is interpreted broadly. Under an approach like the
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Fourth Circuit’s in Mitchell, the violation of a regulation that was
promulgated through a purely civil statute that itself provides no
criminal penalty could be criminalized through § 545. This outcome would run afoul of Grimaud because the careful constraints
on agency action that typically accompany the criminalization of
regulatory violations in statutes like the Forest Reserve Act are
entirely absent in § 545. In perhaps the worst-case scenario, an
agency could even create seemingly benign regulations under authority granted by a purely civil statute with the specific intent of
using these regulations as predicate offenses for § 545. By allowing such possibilities, a broad approach to “contrary to law,” like
in Mitchell, would allow agencies to opportunistically use existing
statutory grants of rulemaking authority to effectively override
Congress’s intent in those statutes and to define criminal law
without meaningful congressional constraints.
Additionally, a broad interpretation of “contrary to law”
would fail the test put forth in Loving. Once again, Loving held
that agencies are allowed to define what conduct is criminal
through regulations if (1) “Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense,” (2) Congress “fixes the punishment,”
and (3) the regulations “confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute.”239 If all regulations with the “force and effect
of law” were “law” under § 545, the statute would arguably fail
the Loving test. In the case of purely civil regulations—regulations that do not specify criminal punishments or that stem from
authorizing statutes that do not contemplate criminal sanctions—Congress did not make the violation of those particular
regulations a criminal offense and did not specifically “fix” a criminal punishment for violating the regulations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is unclear what constitutes the “field”
of § 545. Unlike other statutes authorizing administrative crimes,
§ 545 does not authorize the creation of any regulations at all, so
it does not provide an intelligible principle or any discernible
boundaries that define the statute’s field. Therefore, expansive
understandings of “law” in § 545 would violate the Supreme
Court’s separation of powers doctrine by failing to meet the
Loving conditions for allowing agencies to define criminal conduct.
Although existing Supreme Court precedents, such as
Grimaud and Loving, already require “contrary to law” in § 545
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to be understood narrowly, this conclusion would become even
stronger if the Court were to adopt the strict nondelegation doctrine outlined in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent. The threeprong test presented there would likely make it unconstitutional
for Congress to allow agencies to define crimes in any way because this would be an administrative “policy choice” rather than
just “filling in details.” A broad reading of § 545 would allow agencies to turn civil regulatory violations into criminal offenses. Under the first prong of the Gundy dissent’s test, this would qualify
as a policy decision that must be made by Congress and not an
agency. Thus, while a broad interpretation of “contrary to law”
would already violate the nondelegation doctrine as it is currently
understood, such an understanding would even more obviously
violate the stronger version of the doctrine foreshadowed by the
dissent in Gundy. Because the logic of the Gundy dissent—or at
least some version of this logic—seems destined to become the law
of the land in the near future, this is an especially important consideration for interpreting § 545.
In addition to running afoul of both the Supreme Court’s current and its likely future separation of powers doctrines, a broad
interpretation of “contrary to law” would squarely implicate many
of the aforementioned concerns that scholars have raised in critiquing administrative crimes. By allowing agencies to use civil
rulemaking authority to create criminal offenses without
Congress’s direct approval, such an interpretation of § 545 would
stray far from the constitutional scheme that Professor Barkow
described, in which “Congress must criminalize the conduct.”240
Moreover, giving agencies this ability allows them to almost entirely write and enforce certain criminal law provisions, concentrating power and removing the structural barrier to punishing
individuals that Professors Hessick and Hessick identified as important to preventing overcriminalization. And given that agencies are necessarily more insulated from direct democratic checks
than Congress, allowing them to effectively create criminal offenses without meaningful congressional constraints poses a serious potential threat of government abuse and excessive individual liberty deprivation, aligning with Professor Fissell’s concerns.
These threats are particularly acute because, as Professor
Barkow reasoned, criminal defendants and convicted individuals
have little political sway or lobbying abilities. Therefore, even if
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these scholars’ concerns are less serious or have been dismissed
by courts in the traditional administrative crime context, they are
highly relevant in the § 545 context and warn against adopting
an expansive understanding of “contrary to law.
But the Ninth Circuit’s narrower interpretation of § 545 in
Alghazouli is in line with the Court’s nondelegation doctrine precedent and assuages scholars’ separation of powers concerns. By
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, under which only regulatory violations that Congress has specifically criminalized
through statutes can serve as § 545 predicate offenses, courts
would be allowing greater criminal sanctions to be applied only to
the types of administrative crimes that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly deemed permissible in cases like Grimaud and Loving.
And given that under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, Congress
makes all of the relevant policy decisions in creating criminal law
and agencies are left to merely fill in details, this interpretation
satisfies even the stronger form of the nondelegation doctrine that
is seen in the Gundy dissent and that the Court seems likely to
adopt soon. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “contrary
to law” not only comports with courts’ understandings of § 545’s
predecessor statutes and with the way “contrary to law” is understood in other statutory contexts but also aligns with the Supreme
Court’s current, and potentially future, separation of powers doctrine.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s approach avoids many of the
separation of powers concerns that scholars have identified. For
example, by limiting the scope of § 545 to conduct that Congress
has already criminalized, the Alghazouli approach avoids conflicting with the scheme for criminal lawmaking and enforcement
that Professor Barkow asserted is proper. Because it keeps the
decision to criminalize actions solely in the hands of the legislature, preserving democratic accountability, this approach also
mitigates Professor Fissell’s concerns regarding government
abuse and excessive deprivation of individual liberty. And this
narrow interpretation of “contrary to law” limits the concentration of power in one branch by preserving the structural barrier
between the power to criminalize certain activities and the power
to enforce criminal laws.
Finally, although following the Ninth Circuit’s approach
would limit the applicability of § 545, it would not render the statute useless to prosecutors. Many other importation-related statutes provide for only minor criminal penalties, whereas § 545’s
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maximum prison sentence is twenty years. Because even a narrow interpretation of § 545 would still allow this twenty-year
maximum sentence to apply to statutory violations and regulatory violations specifically criminalized by other statutes, § 545
would remain valuable to prosecutors as a way to elevate punishments when appropriate. However, adopting the Ninth Circuit’s
approach would entirely eliminate the concerning possibility of
an individual facing up to twenty years in prison under § 545 despite committing only a minor regulatory violation that would
otherwise be punishable with only a small civil penalty. No doubt
prosecutors, exercising their discretion, would be highly unlikely
to seek twenty-year prison sentences for such minor offenders.
But cases like United States v. Lawson—in which the application
of § 545 elevated the defendants’ punishments for violating a civil
regulation from paying fines to spending months in prison and
having felony convictions on their criminal records—show that
the applicability of § 545 still has life-altering impacts. By limiting the statute’s scope to defendants who have committed statutory violations or regulatory violations that are explicitly criminalized by a separate statute, a narrow interpretation of § 545
ensures that the statute is employed judiciously—only when
Congress clearly deemed it appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Title 18, U.S.C. § 545 has been a subject of dispute in recent
years, with numerous courts weighing in on how the statute’s
phrase “contrary to law” should be understood. While each of the
courts in this circuit split presents compelling reasoning in support of its interpretation of the statute, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Alghazouli is ultimately the most faithful to historical interpretations of “contrary to law,” the meaning of the phrase
in other statutory contexts, and Supreme Court precedent on the
proper role of the executive and legislative branches with respect
to criminal law. Widespread adoption of the Alghazouli interpretation, which understands “contrary to law” as allowing only
those statutory and regulatory violations that are specifically
criminalized in statutes to serve as predicate offenses that trigger
§ 545’s severe criminal penalties, would have significant consequences going forward. In particular, because § 545 is often used
by prosecutors to bring more severe penalties against defendants,
many defendants who have committed only small, civil regulatory
infractions would no longer face the possibility of receiving severe
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criminal punishments through a § 545 conviction. For some defendants this difference between receiving a civil penalty and a
felony-level criminal punishment can undoubtedly be life changing, so narrowing the applicability of § 545 and excluding the
many regulatory offenses that fall outside of the statute’s purview
under the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Alghazouli would have tangible and far-reaching impacts on many lives.

